By the proclamation, if offenders should escape into those territories, they are to be arrested by the military force and sent into the colony for trial. That the Governor of South Carolina continued to exercise jurisdiction south of Georgia. The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation, can never be controverted. That seven of the eight proprietors of the Carolinas surrendered to George 2d in the year 1729, who appointed a Governor of South Carolina.
To part with it is to commit a species of political suicide. But the difficulty arises on the word "obligation,". north lat., and from the Atlantic to the South Sea.
Usb-c Portable Monitor, Fletcher v. Peck (1810) is the fourth landmark Supreme Court case, the first in the Economics module, featured in the KTB Prep American Government and Civics Series designed to acquaint users with the origins, concepts, organizations, and policies of the United States government and political system. The first covenant in the deed is that the State of Georgia, at the time of the act of the Legislature thereof entitled as aforesaid, was legally seised in fee of the soil thereof subject only to the extinguishment of part of the Indian title thereon. The state legislatures can pass no ex post facto law. Whether the words, 'acts impairing the obligation of contracts,' can be construed to have the same force as must have been given to the words 'obligation and effect of contracts,' is the difficulty in my mind. The right of jurisdiction is essentially connected to, or rather identified with, the national sovereignty. The Court can perceive no sufficient grounds for making this distinction. Once the sale is complete, the State has lost all control over it.
12th February, 1781, vol. Upon the issue joined upon the fourth plea, the jury found the following special verdict, viz. If contracts made with the State are to be exempted from their operation, the exception must arise from the character of the contracting party, not from the words which are employed. In the Constitution of Georgia, adopted in the. The court cannot say that, in passing that act, the legislature has transcended its powers, and violated the constitution.
Since, then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues, and since the Constitution uses the general term "contract" without distinguishing between those which are executory and those which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the former. When a law is in the nature of a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights. The principle asserted is, that one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature. I have been very unwilling to proceed to the decision of this cause at all. That afterwards, in the same year, the legislature of the state of Georgia passed an act, declaring her right, and proclaiming her title to all the lands lying within her boundaries to the river Mississippi. And by the third article of the convention aforesaid, it was agreed by the said States of South Carolina and Georgia that the said State of South Carolina should not thereafter claim any lands to the eastward, southward, southeastward, or west of the said boundary above established; and that the said State of South Carolina did relinquish and cede to the said State of Georgia all the right, title, and claim which the said State of South Carolina had to the government, sovereignty, and jurisdiction in and over the same, and also the right and preemption of soil from the native Indians, and all the estate, property, and claim which the said State of South Carolina had in or to the said lands. It was the first case in which the U. S. Supreme Court held that a state law violated the federal Constitution. In this case I entertain, on two points, an opinion different from that which has been delivered by the court. And further, that all the title which the said state of Georgia ever had in the aforegranted premises has been legally conveyed to the said John Peck by force of the conveyances aforesaid. Nor would it be difficult, with the same view, for laws to be framed which would bring the conduct of individuals under the review of adequate tribunals, and make them suffer under the consequences of their own immoral conduct. It is, therefore, the opinion of this court, that the circuit court erred in overruling the demurrer to the first plea by the defendant pleaded, and that their judgment ought therefore to be reversed, and that judgment on that plea be rendered for the plaintiff.
Its possessions nationally are in nowise necessary to its political existence; they are entirely accidental, and may be parted with in every respect similarly to those of the individuals who compose the community.