Peters1893: I. We can do this because people are good judges of what they are acquainted with, but this in turn implies that the young (in age or in character), being inexperienced, are not suitable for study of this type of political subject.[14]. For if he lives under the sway of his passions, he will not listen to the arguments by which you would dissuade him, nor even understand them. Peters1893: IV. Life, then, is desirable, and most of all desirable to the good man, because his existence is good to him, and pleasant; for he is pleased by the consciousness of that which is good in itself. 12.: Of the friendship of kinsmen and comrades. Peters1893: VI. For when reason or imagination announces an insult or slight, the angry passion infers, so to speak, that its author is to be treated as an enemy, and then straightway boils up; appetite, on the other hand, if reason or sense do but proclaim “this is pleasant,” rushes to enjoy it. Peters1893: VII. Peters1893: I. 11, 2Now, all these four formed faculties which we have enumerated not unnaturally tend in the same direction. Peters1893: I. They are quick to make friendships, therefore, and quick to drop them; for Edition: current; Page: [257]their friendship changes as the object which pleases them changes; and pleasure of this kind is liable to rapid alteration.

[69], Leo Strauss notes that this approach, as well as Aristotle's discussion of magnanimity (above), are in contrast to the approach of the Bible.[70].          Sexual Content 1, 2those who are investigating the nature of virtue, and will also help legislators in assigning rewards and punishments.

Some are impelled to this conduct by a kind of honesty, or desire to avoid what is disgraceful—I mean that some of them seem, or at any rate profess, to be saving, in order that they may never be compelled to do anything disgraceful; e.g.

2, 1If then in what we do there be some end which we wish for on its own account, choosing all the others as means to this, but not every end without exception as a means to something else (for so we should go on ad infinitum, and desire would be left void and objectless),—this evidently will be the good or the Peters1893: I. For it implies a determination of the will which is more permanent in its nature than a merely intellectual habit. 3, 16High-mindedness, then, seems to be the crowning grace, as it were, of the virtues; it makes them greater, and cannot exist without them. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. 8, 6On the other hand, he who is engaged in speculation Edition: current; Page: [343]needs none of these things for his work; nay, it may even be said that they are a hindrance to speculation: but as a man living with other men, he chooses to act virtuously; and so he will need things of this sort to enable him to behave like a man. 8, 1Courage proper, then, is something of this sort. 3, 2(But we ought to begin by inquiring whether the species of continence and the species of incontinence of which we are here speaking are to be distinguished from other species by the field of their manifestation or by their form or manner—I mean whether a man is to be called incontinent in this special sense merely because he is incontinent or uncontrolled by reason in certain things, or because he is incontinent in a certain manner, or rather on both grounds; and in connection with this we ought to determine whether or no this incontinence and this continence may be displayed in all things. Munro, Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, vol.

He omits also to tell us how the relative worth of the persons is to be measured, but he has already said all that is necessary in 3, 7. Wisdom and prudence are the excellences of the reason or intellect (νον̂ς in its widest meaning). Peters1893: III.

Reading σ[Editor: illegible character]τω. or how could his position be maintained and preserved without friends? Peters1893: IV. The mean which justice aims at (the just thing, the due share of goods) lies between two extremes, too much and too little; so far justice is analogous to the other virtues: but whereas in other fields these two extremes are chosen by different and opposite characters (e.g. Peters1893: IV. We have already spoken of the characters that are displayed in social intercourse in the matter of pleasure and pain; let us now go on to speak in like manner of those who show themselves truthful or untruthful in what they say and do, and in the pretensions they put forward. For it seems to me that the physician does not even seek for health in this abstract way, but seeks for the health of man, or rather of some particular man, for it is individuals that he has to heal. 12, 10Now, this power is not identical with prudence, but is its necessary condition. And so the one cannot include the other; for action is not production, nor is production action. Peters1893: V. 7, 7“That which is unjust,” we must notice, is different from “an act of injustice,” and “that which is just” from “an act of justice:” for a thing is unjust either by nature or by ordinance; but this same thing when done is called “an act of injustice,” though before it was done it could only be called unjust. Book I Chapter 2. Peters1893: X. It seems, therefore, that a clear distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary is necessary for Peters1893: III.

And the answer surely is that mathematics is an abstract science, while the principles of wisdom and of natural science are only to be derived from a large experience;† and that thus, though a young man may repeat propositions of the latter kind, he does not really believe them, while he can easily apprehend the meaning of mathematical terms. But still to be fearless in regard to these things is not strictly courage; though here also the term is sometimes applied in virtue of a certain resemblance. 7, 2; VI. two kinds of vice, one marked by excess, the other by deficiency, and one kind of virtue, the observance of the mean. For Aristotle, akrasia, "unrestraint", is distinct from animal-like behavior because it is specific to humans and involves conscious rational thinking about what to do, even though the conclusions of this thinking are not put into practice. 11, 4Secondly, with regard to those pleasures that are individual [i.e. 11.: We must now discuss pleasure. I call those things accidentally pleasant that have a restorative effect; for as the restoration cannot take place unless that part of the system which remains healthy be in some way active, the restoration itself seems pleasant: but I call those things naturally pleasant that stimulate the activity of a healthy system.*. 2.: The function of the intellect, both in practice and speculation, is to attain truth. For in deliberation we seem to inquire and to analyze in the way described, just as we analyze a geometrical figure in order to learn how to construct Peters1893: III. But he who sets his face against everything is, as we have already said, cross and contentious. Categ. The two characters coincide perfectly only in the perfect state: cf. supra, I. [16], In chapter 2, Aristotle asserts that there is one highest aim, eudaimonia (traditionally translated as "happiness"), and it must be the same as the aim politics should have, because what is best for an individual is less beautiful (kalos) and divine (theios) than what is good for a people (ethnos) or city (polis). Peters1893: X. The name itself, too, seems to indicate this, implying that something is chosen before or in preference to other things.*. We allow, on the one hand, that some who do just acts are not yet just; e.g. 9, 9Life itself, then, is good and pleasant (as appears also from the fact that all desire it, and especially the good and the blessed; for life is most desirable to them, and their life is the most blessed). 5, 11This is shown by the way in which men train themselves for any kind of contest or performance: they practise continually. Peters1893: V. 11, 4Again, if we take the word unjust in the other sense, in which it is used to designate not general badness, but a particular species of vice, we find that in this sense also it is impossible to act unjustly to one’s self. [1] In other words, it is not only a contemplation about good living, because it also aims to create good living. Peters1893: VIII. This is the reason why some men that lack [scientific] knowledge are more efficient in practice than others that have it, especially men of wide experience; for if you know that light meat is digestible and wholesome, but do not know what meats are light, you will not be able to cure people so well as a man who only knows that chicken is light and wholesome. when they endure something disgraceful or painful in order to secure some great and noble result: but in the contrary case they are Edition: current; Page: [60]blamed; for no worthy person would endure the extremity of disgrace when there was no noble result in view, or but a trifling one. It is not the superabundance of good things that makes a man independent, Peters1893: X. Moreover, all the proverbs point to the same conclusion—such as “Friends have one soul,” “Friends have all things in common,” “Equality makes friendship,” “The knee is nearer than the shin.” All these characteristics are found in the highest degree in a man’s relations to himself; for he is his own best friend: and so he must love himself better than any one else. Book I Chapter 11 1101a-1101b. the same ratio] between the persons and the things: as the things are to one another, so must the persons be.

a lover of the flute is unable to attend to an argument if he hears a man playing, since he takes more delight in flute-playing than in his present business; the pleasure of the flute-player, therefore, hinders the exercise of the reason. Peters1893: I. 13, 2But accusations and reproaches arise solely or mostly in friendships whose motive is profit, as we should expect. In the papers of October 8, 1880, a suit is reported in which A tries in vain to recover from B certain goods given during courtship,—according to B as presents, according to A ἐπὶ ῥητοɩ̂ς, viz. For* a man’s character seems to reveal itself in these sallies or playful movements, and so we judge of his moral constitution by them, as we judge of his body by its movements. Peters1893: IX. For this reason too, then, our whole inquiry must be concerned with these matters; since to be pleased and pained in the right or the wrong way has great influence on our actions.